How do natural disasters affect electoral participation? The existing social science literature offers contradicting predictions. On the one hand a considerable literature in sociology and psychology suggest that traumatic events can inspire pro-social behavior, which might increase turnout. On the other hand, political science has long held that economic resources are crucial ingredients for civic engagement. Consequentially, natural disasters should reduce electoral participation. We show how these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker and Ordeshook model of voting. This paper then reports results on the impact of the 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany on turnout in federal and state elections in Saxonia and Bavaria, conducted few weeks after the floods. Analyzing community level turnout data, and drawing on a differencein-differences framework, we find that flood exposure has a consistent negative effect on turnout, even in the wake of a quick and effective government response. This indicates that the increase in the costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in our case. This stands in contrast to results from developing contexts, where flood management was convincingly linked to electoral participation, suggesting that the impact of natural disasters might differ substantially between developed and developing countries. We additionally find no support for mechanisms proposed in other contexts, e.g. the salience of the race or partisanship, pointing to the need for additional research.
INTRODUCTION
What is the impact of natural disasters on politics? With an expected increase in the frequency of weather extremes in the future due to climate change, 1 addressing this question is important. Previous research on this topic has focused predominately on the impact of natural disasters on incumbent vote shares. While one part of the literature considers any effect of natural disasters on candidates' vote shares as blind retrospection 2 , an other part sees natural disasters as an opportunity for voters to observe their government's reaction, learn about its type, and condition their vote accordingly. 3 Comparatively few studies have considered explicitly how natural disasters affect political participation.
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This paper investigates the impact of two natural disasters in Germany, two floods termed 'one hundred year events', on voter turnout. The existing social science literature offers contradictory predictions for such events. On the one hand, research in sociology and psychology suggests that traumatic events, such as natural disasters, can inspire pro-social behaviour 5 and lead to grass-roots creation of self-help organizations 6 , both of which have been shown to be positively correlated with political engagement and thereby turnout. 7 On the other hand, political science has long argued that economic resources are critical ingredients for civic engagement. 8 Political participation is modelled as a regular consumption decision, requiring time and money. Consequentially, the destruction of economic resources and potential dislocation due to natural disasters should therefore dampen turnout in affected communities.
We show how these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker and Or- The two German states Saxonia and Bavaria are interesting contexts, since they differ in at least two important aspects: experience with democracy and average economic well-being.
Paying close attention to causal identification in our research design, we find a consistent, though moderate-sized, negative impact of flood exposure on turnout, especially among the most severely flooded communities (effects range between 0.35 and 0.65 percentage points).
Our results suggest that, at least in the German context, the increase in costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in the aftermath of the floods.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Among the studies that have looked at how natural disaster affect turnout, empirical results are mixed. Combining geo-coded flood data, official election returns from national and provincial assembly elections, a large household survey from Punjab province, and a large district-level representative survey to study the impact and mechanism of the 2010-11
Pakistani floods on political engagement, Fair et al. 11 find that Pakistanis in highly floodaffected areas became significantly more politically engaged than those less exposed. They argue that when the government and civil society response effectively blunts a disaster's economic impacts, then political engagement may increase as citizens learn the value of government capacity. Consistent with the proposed learning mechanism, they find evidence that the increase in turnout was higher in areas with lower ex ante flood risk.
Sinclair, Hall, and Alvarez, 12 on the other hand, argue that Hurricane Katrina had an average negative impact on turnout, based on combining flood-depth information with voting records data for mayoral elections in New Orleans. On closer inspection, however, they found that the relationship is u-shaped: while light to moderate flood exposure reduced electoral participation, more severely affected areas had an increase in turnout. Referring to two competing mechanisms, they argue that the Katrina floods potentially both increased the costs of voting due to economic hardship and at the same time increased salience among the most severely affected citizens, as flood reconstruction plans were a key issue in the mayoral race. Hence, while the costs of voting outweighed the potential benefits among less affected voters, the potential benefits seemed to have been significantly higher than voting costs for the most severely affected. Extending the rational choice framework, 20 the Riker-Ordeshook model conceptualizes the turnout decision as a cost-benefit calculus of the form
where R is the expected benefit from turning out, which depends on the benefit derived from the election result (B), multiplied by the probability of casting a decisive vote (p) (i.e., either creating or breaking a tie), the benefit derived engaging in the process (i.e., an inherent taste for voting) or fulfilling a civic duty (D), and finally the costs of participation (C) (i.e., the time and resources necessary to make an informed choice and cast a ballot). Hence, the greater the benefit derived from the election result or engaging in the process, the greater the probability of casting a deciding vote, and the lower the costs of voting, the greater the individual turnout propensity should be. Theoretically, natural disasters may affect B, C, and D. Below we discuss their potential impact on each term separately.
The benefits derived from an election result (B) depends largely on the difference in ideological positions of the candidates or parties. Natural disasters might affect issue salience and thereby highlight key differences for voters between contenders. For example, natural disasters could highlight differences in recovery and disaster prevention policy, which will make the outcome of the election more consequential for natural disaster victims, which should increase their turnout. However, because the probability of casting a decisive ballot is virtually zero, any differential changes in B between victims and non-victims should have no measurable effect on turnout.
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Because the probability of casting a decisive ballot is virtually zero and therefore any benefit derived from the election result is extremely low, even small increases in costs (C) can lead to considerable drops in turnout. 22 Hence, as natural disasters increase the individual costs associated with learning about candidates and parties and most importantly voting per se, we should expect aggregate turnout in areas affected by natural disasters to be lower, especially in those places that were most severely hit.
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Natural disasters might also affect the D term through inspiring pro-social behavior and the formation of social capital. An extensive psychology literature argues that in the aftermath of natural disasters pro-social attitudes and behaviour tend to dominate. 24 electoral campaigns, especially of SPD and Greens. 37 In contrast, the 2013 federal election was dominated by a strong CDU incumbent, Chancellor Merkel, who had lead the German economy through the Euro crisis. 38 Similarly, the 2013 state election in Bavaria was characterized by a strong CSU incumbent, Governor Seehofer, aiming to regain the parliamentary majority for the CSU, which has been dominating Bavarian politics for decades; campaigning was very much dominated by topics of the federal electoral campaign. 39 Crucial for our analysis here, we could not find any specific campaign issues in both Bavaria or Saxonia that correlate with flood exposure and might therefore confound our flood estimates.
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
We use aggregate electoral data on community level -the lowest level of analysis at which turnout changes are traceable and thus the most detailed information that is publicly available.
For our main Tables 1-3 We select a wide range of control variables following economic voting theory. These include logged population, logged brute community income, logged brute tax income (Saxony only, as it is not available for Bavaria 2013), the proportion of elderly (i.e., age>65) and youth citizens (i.e., age<18), and the employment rate (Bavaria only, as not available for Saxony 2002). Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Appendix Table A8 . In terms of the Rubin Causal Framework 47 , our analysis relies on the central assumption that common trends in the treated (i = 1, ...n 1 ) and control observations (i = n 1 + 1, ...n)
are present over the electoral period we observe (from t − 1 to t). We therefore assume that
We assess whether the central assumption of no effect in the pre-treatment population holds. 48 Our placebo estimates indicated that pre-flood trends were not perfectly parallel (see Placebo Test section and Appendix Table A1 ), so we pre-processed our data via entropy weighting 49 to generate a control group that perfectly matches the distribution of pre-treatment outcome and control variables. Entropy weighting is a data pre-processing technique that directly generates balanced samples given a binary treatment indicator. The aim is to find a set of weights such that the distribution of treatment group characteristics in pre-specified moments is perfectly matched by the re-weighted control group. Compared to matching entropy weighting has several advantages. 50 First, it provides a higher degree of covariate balance, in our case for the first, second, and third moments of the covariate distributions. This is a valuable property, as we no longer need to check for covariate balance, as the pre-treatment outcome and control variables in both groups show identical distributions by construction, resulting in placebo estimates of precise zeros. Second, entropy weighting retains valuable information in the preprocessed data by allowing the unit weights to vary smoothly across units, achieving balance while keeping them as close to one as possible.
Finally, the method is computationally attractive since the optimization problem to find the unit weights is well behaved and globally convex. Hence, if no time-varying confounders that both affect treatment status and pre-treatment outcomes have been left out of the calculation of these weights, our comparison between treatment and control groups will produce unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT).
Our ATT is therefore equal to the difference in (entropy weighted) trends between flooded and non-flooded communities :
We estimate effects with an (entropy weighted) fixed-effects estimator including year (α t ) and unit fixed (γ i ) effects. This estimator will give us the ATT (β) we are interested in via the estimation of
A vector X of time-variant controls is included to take potential differences in time trends into account. For Bavaria, where a large part of the state was not treated, we restrict our control group to the south-eastern areas of the state (see highlighted area in Figure   2 ), as we expect the distribution of potential unobservable time-varying confounders to be better balanced between treatment and control group the geographically closer treatment and control groups are. and Saxony (federal elections). We report an, on average, moderate negative treatment effect. Turnout in affected communities declined by approximately half a percentage point.
Thereafter, we present disaggregated treatment effects to find out about heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Finally, we assess the robustness of our results, especially to violations of SUTVA -we do not find that spill-overs are likely to bias our results. 
Main Results
Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
To assess the heterogeneity of the flood effect, we disaggregate our binary treatment indicator into the quartiles of the distribution of 'severity' of flood affectedness. For each of these treated quartiles, we construct a perfectly balanced control group by entropy weighting and estimate the ATT.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
There are two main results. First, as can be seen in Column 4 across all Panels of Table 2, our results indicate that the fourth quartile, those most heavily affected, are consistently less likely to turn out. This effect is most clearly visible for the federal election results in Bavaria: the more affected a community was, the lower its participation in the election. The fourth quartile shows a highly significant negative effect of -0.66 percentage points. There are at least two potential explanations for this finding. Interpreting these results through the lens of 56 , they are consistent with a 'surprise' effect. The degree of flood exposure most likely correlates with ex ante risk of being flooded: those communities more severely affected are likely to be those regularly flooded due to their geographic location. Hence, among the least affected the proportion of communities that are hit only in extraordinary floods is likely to be greater. They were least prepared and the floods therefore had the greatest impact on turnout in those communities.
Alternatively, the findings might be an artefact of our measurement, share of the community area flooded, which is a noisy indicator of how traumatic the floods were for a community. The first quantile most likely contains just as many barely affected places as communities that got lucky and just escaped a catastrophe. Satellites would capture almost no flooding in places where the river is channelled, water levels were dangerously high but no dykes broke, but large-scale evacuations might have taken place in many such communities.
This certainly has the potential to translate into large political effects as well, although the flood layer would show much flooding.
Robustness
We are especially worried about spill-overs, which would violate the SUTVA assumption and bias our inference. Spill-overs could arise from media-coverage of the floods as well as personal experience or ties with affected regions. We would be especially concerned if spillovers were positive while our main effect is negative. This would result in an overestimation of the ATT and our results would merely provide an upper bound of the true effect. While we are unable to assess the global effects of spill-overs (e.g. effects of media coverage of the flood etc.), there is good reason to expect regional heterogeneity in these spill-overs.
In particular, they should be stronger the geographically closer a community is to affected rivers, which is testable. We therefore coded communities directly bordering our flood layer, but not situated along the affected rivers, separately. Table 3 reports results.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
In Columns 1, 4 and 7 we estimate the ATT excluding communities that neighbour flood affected places from our analysis. The estimates remain consistently negative and statistically significant. If anything, our results get slightly stronger, which implies negative spill-overs and an underestimation of the true effect. In fact, the estimates reported in Columns 3, 6 and 9 confirm this conjecture. Estimating a (placebo) effect for adjacent communities and excluding actually flooded communities from the sample, there seems to be a slightly lower turnout trend in communities neighbouring flood affected places than for communities further away. Hence, if there are any spill-overs they are likely to be negative.
Finally, Columns 2, 5, and 8 report estimates based on comparing affected to adjacent nonflooded communities. While the estimates are slightly smaller and no longer statistically significant, they are consistently negative, as would be expected if small spill-overs in the direction of the main effect are present. We therefore conclude that spill-overs might be present, though we should not be worried about them econometrically, as they, if anything, lead to an underestimation of our main effect.
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conducted a series of additional checks.
We summarize our findings below and report the respective tables in the Online Appendix.
Given the indication of parallel trends through the 1994-1998 placebo, we estimated Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 and Table 2 for Bavaria with unweighted fixed-effects regressionsour main interpretation is unaffected by this modelling strategy (see Table A2 ). Additionally, as the Bavarian flood layer relies on satellite data that did not perfectly capture flood extent in the southernmost communities of the state, we re-estimated Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 but recoded the treatment dummy to include all communities that border an affected river within districts where disaster alarm was called. Results are unchanged with this definition of treatment (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Finally, for Bavaria, estimating effects with a continuous flood indicator similarly leads to consistent negative effects around 0.3-0.4
percentage points for every 10 percentage points of community area flooded. These effects are estimated with unweighted fixed-effects regressions as entropy weights cannot be calculated for continuous treatments (see Table A4 ).
Given the community boundary changes in Saxony that required us calculate entropy weights on 1998 levels rather than 1994-1998 trends, we re-estimated the fixed effects regressions on trends (1998-2002) reported in Tables 1 and 2 without entropy weights. Moreover, we also ran a level regression for Saxonia in 2002 controlling for past turnout in federal elections in 1998. The results are reported in Appendix Table A6 and are qualitatively similar to the weighted results reported in the main paper.
An additional concern relates to the voting of displaced persons: If citizens vote outside their voting district (because of flood related dislocations), this mechanically leads to an increase in turnout in unaffected (control group) communities and to a decrease in treatment group communities, which might explain our negative ATT estimates. Appendix Tables A5 and A7 provide evidence that this is unlikely to be the case. If displaced persons indeed voted outside their communities, we would expect this to occur predominately in neighbouring communities, which should result in more urn voting. For Bavaria, where we were able to gather data on community level urn voting and postal voting, urn voting turnout in communities neighbouring flooded communities is lower or equal (Appendix Table A5 , column 4 and 8). For Saxonia, Appendix Table A7 , column 5, reports effects for an even better measure: we can assess the (cross-sectional) share of voters that voted with a 'voting card' that is required for out of district voting at the ballot box. Comparing Saxonian communities unaffected and those bordering affected communities, there is no evidence for an increase in 'out of district voting'. Overall, this leads us to conclude that flood displacement did not mechanically confound our estimates. Of course, nonetheless physical dislocation might have induced stress and/or increased voting costs to an extent that explains our treatment effect. After all, accessibility is an important determinant of turnout, which we expect to be affected by the flood.
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Using the data on postal and urn voting, we can learn even more about how the floods affected participation patterns, lending additional support to our main conclusions. Appendix Table A7 reports With respect to policy implications, both theoretically and empirically our results highlight that it is important to take steps to reduce the costs of voting in a post-disaster environment, e.g. by increased administrative flexibility concerning electoral registration and application processes for postal voting. For Saxonia, where the temporal distance between flood and election was especially short, we find evidence that postal voting was used at a disproportionally higher rate in affected districts, although not to an extent that would have made up for the overall negative turnout effect.
Finally, and more broadly, a negative aggregate turnout effect of natural disasters could have consequential effect on disaster prevention policy, especially in proportional electoral systems. Over time, and in particular if disaster frequencies in a certain region increases, the small turnout effects of any individual disaster can build up to sizeable effects due to habit formation (i.e., voters (especially first-time voters) that do not participate in elections are less likely to participate in future elections). 67 When turnout decreases in regions exposed to natural disasters, the electorate shifts towards constituents for which the saliency of disaster prevention might be lower, with consequences for the electoral platforms offered by politicians. The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. The regressions are estimated in the 2014 community boundaries. All models are fixed effects regressions and use entropy weights from placebo difference-in-difference regressions of the preceding electoral period including controls (in case of Saxony: of 1998 turnout and control levels). Models 1-3 are estimated for Saxonian communities, models 4-9 for communities in the three south-eastern Bavarian regions with floods occurring in 2013. Community level clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. The estimated constant is not shown. Regressions include the following controls: logged population, logged brute income (Saxonia only), logged brute tax income, employment rate (Bavaria only), proportion of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), and the proportion of youth citizens (i.e., age< 18)). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***).
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